Areas: Philosophy of Economics; Social Epistemology; Philosophy of Science
Current Projects:
Methodology of science and expertise
Description: Pluralist stances in methodology of science recognize subjective expert judgment as one among the many sources of evidence, next to others such like models, statistical information, historical sources, etc. As a source of evidence, subjective expert judgment requires a dedicated methodology; e.g. for assessing the boundaries of what is relevant expertise, the methods for eliciting and aggregating expert judgments, etc. In my project I focus on the use of subjective expert judgment in economics, with a focus on economic committees. I evaluate a number of “principles of expertise”, and analyze the case study of the Monetary Policy Committee. This project is at the basis of a DFG-funded workshop I recently organized: Experts and Consensus in Economics and the Social Sciences.
Some research questions:
- To which extend can (and should) subjective expert judgment be applied to problems in the social sciences (e.g. in risk analysis, forecasting, problem exploration), instead of other methods like analytical modeling, actuarial rules, etc.?
- Can we detect the relevant biases in subjective expert judgment and find methods to “de-bias” experts?
- Can we identify which parts of a given scientific consensus (e.g. anthropogenic global warming, monetary policies in a given country, etc.) are based on subjective judgment and which are based on other sources of evidence? In other words, can we “meter” the subjective component of a given scientific consensus?
Papers: Expertise and Institutional Design in Economics (manuscript); The Role of Experts in the Methodology of Economics (submitted); Epistemology of expertise – a view from the trenches (draft).
Cognitive biases
“While every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable.” J.S.Mill
Description: Biases are a well-known source of inaccuracy in science and ill-guided policy making in society. While plenty of research has been dedicated to detecting biases, a lot has yet to be understood about them. In this project I focus on overconfidence. There is much debate about when and how overconfidence creeps in an expert’s judgment, some results showing strong overconfidence effects, and some showing good calibration instead. In a recent experiment, I detect two very different types of overconfidence, local and global, and test their relation to each other and to accuracy scores.
Some research questions:
- Is overconfidence a single phenomenon, or are there different kinds of overconfidence?
- Can we detect the effects of different kinds of overconfidence?
- Can we devise a strategy to “debias” experts, and reduce the overconfidence effect?
Papers: Local and global confidence reports, and overconfidence effect (draft).
Disagreement
Description: What should rational epistemic agents do in a situation of peer disagreement? The literature on epistemic disagreement has provided several arguments supporting the claim that a conciliatory approach is the answer. In other words, when disagreeing with an epistemic peer a rational person should change her beliefs and move her opinions closer to the other agent’s opinion. Stronger still is the view that it is impossible for two rational epistemic peers to disagree after having exchanged their evidence on the subject of disagreement. Both weak and strong conciliatory stances assume, implicitly or explicitly, that disagreement constitutes evidence on which to update one’s beliefs. Whether updating in the light of disagreement is rational at all, and which type of updating is, is at the core of this research project .
Some research questions:
- Are conciliatory position rational?
- Which forms of updating on disagreement are rational, and which are not?
- Is disagreement with someone on a given subject evidence for doubting your own beliefs on that subject?
Papers: A Puzzle about Belief Updating (accepted in Synthese); Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect, with Jan Sprenger and Mark Colyvan (accepted in Erkenntnis).
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- Social Epistemology
Another project of mine concerns models for consensus in small groups (e.g. committees, working groups, etc.). So far, I have written two papers on this project, which you can find at this link, and this link. Related to this project is the topic of my Ph.D. thesis: an investigation on consensus formation in small committees. The project involves an analysis of some of the most prominent models for consensus (such as the Lehrer-Wagner model, the Bounded-Confidence, and the Delphi Method), and of the epistemic properties of consensus formation processes. A third paper, written together with Jan Sprenger and Mark Colyvan, is currently under review.
- Epistemology of Disagreement
I have also written a paper (under review) on the epistemology of disagreement, starting from the standard question in the literature: “What should you do, as a rational agent, when you disagree with an epistemic peer?” In particular, I analyze the details of Bayesian and linear updating in the light of disagreement. I argue that disagreement does not have an evidential role in epistemology. A brief description of this paper can be found here.
- J.S.Mill and biases of human rationality
While teaching J.S.Mill, in the past semester, I realized that there are a number of biases of reasoning which are only enunciated but that were never really explored empirically. It was typical of Mill and his contemporaries to base their statements on human rationality mostly on introspection. I recently developed some experiments (a pilot was completed in December) to test some of those biases.
Selected Talks and Presentations:
“I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence.” Socrates
2012
Modeling Experts — The Use of Expertise in the Social Sciences. BSPS annual conference. (Stirling) July 2012.
Resolving epistemic disagreement (or trying to…). European Epistemology Network Meeting. (Bologna) June 2012.
Expertise and Institutional Design in Economics. Experts and Consensus in Economics and the Social Sciences. (Bayreuth) May 2012.
The Progress of Economic Sciences: The Case Study of the Monetary Policy Committee. The Progress of Science. (Tilburg) April 2012.
2011
The Impossibility of Resolving Disagreement with Bayesian or Linear Updating. ECAP 7 – European Congress of Analytical Philosophy. (Milan) September 2011
Modeling Experts – The Role of Experts in the Methodology of Economics. IX Conference of the International Network for Economic Methodology. (Helsinki) September 2011
Modeling Experts – The Role of Experts in the Methodology of Economics. 2011 Conference on the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. (Copenhagen) August 2011
Modeling Expertise in Economics. 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. (Nancy) July 2011
The Future of Scientific Philosophy – Learning from “Scientific Economics”. Crossing Borders, 9th Congress of the Austrian Society for Philosophy. (Vienna) June 2011
The Impossibility of Resolving Disagreement with Bayesian or Linear Updating. European Epistemology Network Meeting. (Lund) March 2011
Outline of a normative theory of consensus formation in economics. Research Colloquium – Institut für Philosophie – Universität Bayreuth. (Bayreuth) February 2011
2010
A Puzzle about Belief Updating. SILFS 2010 - International Congress of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science. (Bergamo) December 2010
Using Expert Judgment for the Formation of Economic Consensus. (Invited talk) International Workshop on Recent Contributions to the Philosophy of Social Sciences – UNED. (Madrid) December 2010
The Role of Experts in the Methodology of Economics. 1st Dutch-Flemish Graduate Conference on Philosophy of Science and Technology. (Ghent) November 2010
Some Lessons from Social Epistemology for the Methodology of Economics. Philsoc Seminar Series. Australian National University. (Canberra) September 2010
Expert Judgment as a Methodological Problem in Economics. Research Seminar Series – History and Philosophy of Science – University of Sydney. (Sydney) August 2010
Why the Conciliatory Position is an Inadequate View on Disagreement. Current projects seminar – Department of Philosophy – University of Sydney. (Sydney) August 2010
The Role of Experts in the Methodology of Economics. 2010 AAHPSSS Conference (Sydney) July 2010
A Puzzle about Belief Updating. 2010 AAP Convention (Sydney) July 2010. Abstract
Modeling in Economics: Some Epistemological Considerations, workshop “Modelling in the Social and Behavioural Sciences I” (Paris) May, 2010
Experts and the Methodology of Economics. Vijfde Vlaams-Nederlands Congres voor Algemene en Speciale Wetenschapsfilosofie – Philosophy of Science in a Forest (Leusden – NL) May, 2010
A Puzzle about Belief Updating. TiLPS EPS research seminar (Tilburg) April, 2010
The Role of Experts in the Epistemology of Economics. Symposium “The Economist as Expert” with Maria Jimenez-Buedo, Julian Reiss, and David Teira. ESHET 2010 (Amsterdam) March, 2010.
2009
The Role of Experts in the Epistemology of Economics. PPE and Philosophy Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania PPE Program (Philadelphia) December, 2009
Symposium: Formal Social Epistemology (organized together with Jason McKenzie Alexander, Igor Douven and Rainer Hegselmann). European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam) October 2009. Symposium Description
From Theory to Practice, The Benefits of Collective Deliberation in Economics. GAP7 – Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie – Section: Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Philosophy of Action and Decision-Making (Bremen) September 2009. Abstract
Network Structures and Decision-Making for Public Policy. Evidence Science and Public Policy (Sydney Center for the Foundations of Science – Sydney) March 2009
Judgement Aggregation in Networked Groups. Coalition Theory Network Workshop 2009 - Matching, Coalitions, Networks and Behavior (Maastricht ) January 2009
Semantic Analysis of Judgement Aggregation Models. VAF 2009 (Vereniging voor Analytische Filosofie) (Tilburg University) January 2009
2008
Discussant of Pau Balart’s Equality of opportunity and welfare in a model of job allocation. Ph.D. seminar series, Department of Economics and Business Administration (Tilburg University ) November 2008
Self-Judgment in the the Lehrer-Wagner Model. Bochum-Lausanne-Tilburg Graduate School: Philosophy of Language, Mind and Science. (Tilburg University) November 2008
Consensus, Deliberation and Bayesian Modeling. Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology (Tlburg University ) October 2008
Judgement Aggregation in Networked Groups. Workshop on Simulations in Social Epistemology. (University of Leuven ) October 2008
Self-Judgment in the Lehrer-Wagner Model. Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Analytical Philosophy, SIFA2008 (University of Bergamo) September 2008
