What should a rational epistemic agent do, when she finds out that her epistemic peer disagrees with her on some factual matter? The literature on disagreement has provided several arguments supporting the claim that a certain degree of openness is the answer. In other words, it is rational to think that, when confronted with disagreement from an epistemic peer, an agent should change her beliefs and move her opinions closer to the other agent’s opinion. Stronger still, is the view that it is impossible for two rational epistemic peers to disagree, after exchanging evidence on the matter of their disagreement. These views go under the name of conciliatory stances on disagreement. Both weak and strong conciliatory stances assume, implicitly or explicitly, that disagreement constitutes evidence on which one should update her beliefs. Starting from that assumption, the goal of this paper is to challenge the aforementioned positions. I will defend the claim that under a wide range of possible interpretations of the aforementioned conciliatory stances, it is not rational to change one’s beliefs in the light of disagreement.